

# When Elites Meet: Decentralization, Power-sharing, and Public Goods Provision in Post conflict Sierra Leone

Presented at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the  
American Political Science Association

Amanda Clayton

Jennifer Noveck

Margaret Levi



# Major Questions

- What is the relationship between decentralization and good governance?
- How does decentralization change power configurations locally? And is the impact on public goods provision, if any?

# Background

- Local Government Act (LGA) 2004
  - Establishes Local Councils
  - Legally subordinated Paramount Chiefdoms
  - Outlined responsibilities of each set of actors

# Paramount Chief Duties

- Supervise local tax collection
- Maintain order
- Preserve traditions and customs
- Serve as an agent of development
- Super sub-chief elections

# Tax Collection

- Local Councils set the amount to be collected and the percent to be paid to the Council
- Chieftdom is responsible for collecting the taxes and remitting the precept
- No min or max set by the LGA (for either amount)

# Reported Tensions

- Chiefs continue to exert formal and informal power over many domains
- Examples of
  - Chiefs collecting taxes but not remitting the precept to the Councils
  - Councils collecting taxes themselves

# Theorizing the relationship

- **Competition**

- Frequent disputes between councilors and chiefs

- **Collusion**

- When equals, this can be characterized as cooperation

- When one has more power, this is cooption

# Data & Methods

- Two types of surveys
  - Decentralization Stakeholders Survey (DSS)
  - National Public Services
  
- DSS 2008
  - Given to all local authorities in 2008-2011 cohort
  - Chiefs and councilors surveys
  - 19 Local Council Areas



# Data & Methods

- NPS 2005-2011
  - Longitudinal survey
  - Designed to measure changes in access and use of public services
  - 6000 households, aggregated to the Enumeration Area (EA) Level
  - 607 EA-level observations

# Data & Methods

- Dependent variables
  - Provision of Healthcare
    - % of respondents per EA that report using government run health facilities in 2011
    - Perception of the quality of government health services improve or getting worse
  - Public Education Services
    - If families with school age children report that the children attend government schools

# DV Correlations

	<b>Use of government health facilities (2011)</b>	<b>Perceptions of government health services (2011)*</b>	<b>Use of government schools (2011)</b>
<b>Use of government health facilities (2011)</b>	1.00		
<b>Perceptions of government health services (2011)*</b>	-0.041	1.00	
<b>Use of government schools (2011)</b>	0.1254	0.0316	1.00


\* Higher values indicate quality has gotten better over the previous year.

# Key Independent Variables

- The directly observable relationship between chiefs – councilors
  - Median self-reported monthly contact with Chiefs
  - % of Councilors who report disputes with Chiefs in the past month
  - % of Councilors who report they are related to a Paramount Chief by blood or marriage


# Key IV Variation

**Median Self-Reported Monthly Contact with Chiefs by Council**




Local Councils (sorted by median contact)

**% of Councilors Reporting Disputes with Chiefs by Council**



Local Councils (sorted by %)

**% of Councilors Reporting Family Ties with Chiefs by Council**



Local Councils (sorted by %)

# EA Level Controls

- Poverty
- ELF
- War experiences
- EA remoteness
  - Distance in miles from EA center to Chief HQ, district HQ
  - Distance to Freetown
  - Nearest passable road
- Main water source
- Average respondents per district treated for malaria
- PC or LC visit in the past year\
- 2008 baseline measures of services

# Council Level Controls

- Gender composition / ratio
- Age
- Education level
- Former CDF membership
- SLPP membership

# Modeling Strategy

- Multi-level model
  - Micro-level units: EA areas
  - Clustered within Macro-level units: Council areas
- Required so we can assume our micro-level units are independently, identically distributed
- Allows us to include controls at EA and Council level





# Results: Use of Gov Health Services

- Use of government health services
  - Median monthly contact
  - % of councilors related through blood
  - **Higher** rates of contact, higher percentage of councilors related by blood to a Paramount Chief associated with **lower** usage of health facilities

# Results: Use of Gov Health Services

**Predicted Values**  
**DV: 2011 EA % Using Gov. Health Services**





# Results: Perceptions of Quality

- Four council-level variables are significant
  - Former CDF participation
  - SLPP membership
  - **Median monthly contact**
  - **% of Disputes with Chiefs reported by Councilors**

# Results: Perceptions of Quality

Predicted Values  
DV: 2011 EA Mean Perceptions of Gov. Health Services





# Results: Government Schools

- Use of government-run schools
  - Median monthly contact
  - % of Disputes with Chiefs reported by Councilors
  - **Higher** rates of contact **decreases** the percentage of enrolled school age children
  - **Higher** rates of disputes **increases** the percentage of enrolled school age children

# Results: Government Schools

Predicted Values  
2011 DV: EA % Using Gov. Schools



# The Role of Competition & Collusion in Development

- Closer relationships between elites is associated with lower levels of public goods provision
  - Collusion has negative effects
- Relationships defined by conflict and disputes is more frequently associated with better / high levels of provision
  - Disputes/ competition has positive effects

# Appendix: Robustness Checks

- Exclude 2008 EA-level baseline measures
- Council-level interactions run between the % of reported disputes and contact with chiefs
  - None achieve statistical significance
- Cross-level interactions between 6 EA-level moderator variables of interest